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Abstract—The present paper deals with the elucidation and 
implementation of the Data Protection by Design (DPbD) 
principle as recently introduced in the European Union data 
protection law, specifically with regards to cybersecurity systems 
in a Smart Home environment, both from a legal and a technical 
perspective. Starting point constitutes the research conducted in 
the Cyber-Trust project, which endeavours the development of an 
innovative and customisable cybersecurity platform for cyber-
threat intelligence gathering, detection and mitigation within the 
Internet of Things ecosystem. During the course of the paper, the 
requirements of DPbD with regards to the conceptualisation, 
design and actual development of the system are presented as 
prescribed in law. These requirements are then translated into 
technical solutions, as envisaged in the Cyber-Trust system. For 
trade-offs are not foreign to the DPbD context, technical 
limitations and legal challenges are also discussed in this 
interdisciplinary dialogue. 
 
Keywords—cybersecurity, data protection by design, Internet 
of Things, cyberthreat intelligence 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The interconnectivity of consumer devices in a Smart 
Home environment - from smart TVs, lightbulbs and coffee 
makers to smart grids and smart security systems - upsurges 
constantly. An increase in connectivity may entail more risks 
for the end-users of those devices in combination with the 
rise in cyberthreats and cybercrime incidents. Often, these 
products come with different levels of embedded security 
features depending on the country of their origin or sale and 
until recently, due to the absence of strong monetary 
incentives for manufacturers to fabricate more secure devices 
[1]. To that can also be added the lack of standardisation in 
the communication protocols and practices followed in the 
operation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. 
To address this situation, legislators in European Union 
Member States and other third countries request the 
integration of minimum built-in security features which 
would protect both the integrity of the connected devices and 
the data on them. On the other hand, tougher obligations are 
imposed upon service providers to ensure security and 
integrity of their services with the deployment of proper 
cybersecurity systems. Amid these circumstances, the Cyber-
Trust project offers a holistic cybersecurity solution, which 
develops around three pillars: proactive cyberthreat 
intelligence technologies, machine learning based detection 
and mitigation tools as well as Distributed Ledger 
Technologies (DLT). Based on those parameters, the Cyber-
Trust project aims to ensure: a. the maintenance of the 
integrity of systems used by various service providers as well 
as by individual end-users, safeguarding selected devices and 
identifying vulnerable or improperly manufactured IoT 
appliances that could endanger all networked apparatus; and 
b. the amplification of cooperation between service providers 
and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) with regards to the 
preservation and transfer of electronic evidence, when a 
cyberattack takes place and is mitigated. 
Given that service providers as data controllers are 
accountable for their cooperation with proper data 
processors, such accountability could also exceed in their 
obligation to select software and IT products which are data 
protection compliant. In this paper, our research is focused 
on the Cyber-Trust solution from a Data Protection by 
Design perspective, by adopting an interdisciplinary 
approach and using as a starting point previous and on-going 
research conducted throughout the project. In order to 
examine how a cybersecurity product can embrace the Data 
Protection by Design principle as set out in Article 25 of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, we structure the paper 
upon two main drives. After discussing what the legal 
obligations are (first drive), we will see how those can be 
translated into technical solutions (second drive). Last, the 
remaining challenges in the form of limitations during the 
research phase as well as post-research will be analysed both 
from a legal and a technological point of view. 
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CYBER-TRUST PROJECT 
The Cyber-Trust project aims to develop an innovative 
cyber-threat intelligence gathering, detection, and mitigation 
platform to tackle the grand challenges towards securing the 
ecosystem of IoT devices. The security problems arising 
from the flawed design of legacy hardware and embedded 
devices allows cyber-criminals to easily compromise them 
and launch large-scale attacks toward critical cyber-
infrastructures. Cyber-Trust is designed especially for 
application in the Smart Home and mobile devices domains 
where a wide range of functionalities of varying complexity 
and implementation strategies are implemented. 
   
 
   
 
 
Figure 1: High-level overview of the proposed cyber-
security platform 
The necessity to monitor end-user IoT devices results in 
great challenges in preserving the privacy of end-users whilst 
gathering enough information for efficient and reliable 
detection of cyber-attacks. One of the primary goals of 
Cyber-Trust is to facilitate information sharing between 
various key stakeholders and therefore, seeks deployment at 
a large scale. Due to this, Cyber-Trust provides end-users 
flexibility in the mode of operation, meaning that the latter 
may select which of their devices will be protected (partial or 
full provision) and whether registered devices will be in for 
passive or active monitoring. Additionally, to allow further 
flexibility, Cyber-Trust is designed to support multi-tier 
registration, at organisation, user and device level for full 
control. 
Cyber-Trust is designed to be self-evolving with feeds 
from external threat intelligence sources, knowledge bases as 
well as anonymised end-user information for the early 
detection and response to persistent cyber-attacks and newly 
discovered/exploited vulnerabilities. Cyber-Trust implements 
a profiling service that correlates, and matches gathered 
external intelligence with internally acquired data. The core 
system gathers information from multiple sources: published 
vulnerabilities, latest patches, firmware releases with the 
latest security updates, manufacturer use guidelines, user 
provided information and runtime information. User 
provided information involves the data and setup provided 
by the end-user since registration, while runtime information 
is collected when the end-user enables active monitoring for 
each device individually; enabling active monitoring on a 
gateway results in monitoring network transactions from all 
connected devices. 
III. MAJOR CHALLENGES REGARDING DATA PROTECTION IN A 
CYBERSECURITY CONTEXT IN THE SMART HOME 
ENVIRONMENT 
It is well-known that, generally, several data protection 
risks appear in the context of Smart Home. More precisely, 
IoT consumer devices process several types of personal data, 
such as the end-users´ location or their daily habits, which 
are transmitted to central servers or shared with other devices 
or third parties. This, in turn, raises several concerns in terms 
of the end-users’ right to personal data protection, since there 
is a possibility of processing these data for other purposes 
(e.g. for profiling the users via fully-automated means), 
without obtaining their consent or having other legal ground, 
for instance. Clearly, such risks necessitate the adoption of 
proper data protection mechanisms. 
Although appropriate security measures suffice to also 
alleviate some data protection concerns – for example, 
regularly updating device firmware is an important step 
towards thwarting several attacks which could yield in 
compromising personal data confidentiality – there are often 
trade-offs between them. This is mainly attributed to the fact 
that, towards enhancing security, there is probably a need to 
massively collect several types of data to be analysed, which 
in turn may pose personal data protection at risk (e.g. in 
terms of respecting the principle of data minimisation). Such 
trade-offs will be thoroughly examined in the context of 
Cyber-Trust, since gathering and appropriately handling 
information from several sources constitutes, as previously 
stated, a crucial building element for the whole system. 
Within the aim to frame the key recommendations for the 
conceptualisation, design and actual development phase of 
the Cyber-Trust  project, the technical partners shared their 
main preliminary concerns identified in a technical level 
regarding the data protection (and privacy) requirements as 
well as respective potential risks. The difficulty in pre-
assessing whether personal data will be processed in each 
specific use-case, as well as the likelihood of a personal data 
breach, including the incidental disclosure of information of 
sensitive character about an end-user´s device,  were 
identified as the primary challenges to be tackled. Other 
concerns referred to the use of tools, such as data filtering 
techniques in order to achieve data minimisation, the 
implications deriving from the use of Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI), the case-by-case assessment of proportionality and 
finally, the handling of material that may contain electronic 
evidence, including measures to avoid unauthorised access 
by third parties. This preliminary assessment performed by 
the technical partners at the conceptualisation phase is used 
as a ground which the Data Protection Impact Assessment 
(DPIA) envisaged for a later stage, will be shaped upon. 
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN IN THE 
CYBERSECURITY CONTEXT 
A. General considerations 
Since 2010 the Article 29 Working Party argues that 
“[d]ata protection must move from ‘theory to practice’. Legal 
requirements must be translated into real data protection 
measures”, [2] in order to tackle risks arising from 
innovative technologies and protect end-users of Information 
and Communications Technologies (ICT) services and 
products with limited or average knowledge and skills [3]. 
Data Protection by Design constitutes a critical combination 
of technology and law [4] and has always been part of data 
protection legislation as one of the most intense forms of 
cooperation between different disciplines. Even though 
DPbD is often interchangeably referred to as Privacy by 
Design since the second term appeared earlier and many 
main notions underlying both principles, it becomes clearer 
that these two are different concepts questing for separate 
assessment [3]. Despite its undoubted significance, it was 
only in 2016 that DPbD was expressly stated as a legal 
requirement in the European Union law in the General Data 
   
 
   
 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [5] along with Data 
Protection by Default in Article 25. 
By implementing appropriate technological and 
organisational measures, data controllers are called to 
consider data protection and privacy issues upfront: not only 
at the time of the processing itself but also at the time of the 
determination of the means for the processing. before the 
data controllers are engaged with any data processing 
operation or the development of a new product. Data 
controllers are expected to take into account the nature, 
scope and context of the processing. Although DPbD turns 
the focus on accountability, it does not entail only a positive 
obligation of the data controller to take action or implement a 
measure. Foremost, it is an obligation from result, meaning 
that best efforts are not sufficient; concerned entities must 
achieve DPbD and be able to prove that they did so [3]. Even 
though it is not explicitly stated in the provision, data 
processors, when processing personal data on behalf of the 
data controller, will also have to implement relevant 
measures in order to contribute to data controllers´ 
compliance obligations, as provided in Articles 4(8) and 28 
GDPR. 
Moreover, the DPbD principle is thought to extend to 
hardware and software providers [3]. More precisely, it 
should be pointed out that, according to Recital 78 GDPR, 
the producers of the products, services and applications that 
are based on the processing of personal data or process 
personal data should be encouraged to take into account the 
right to data protection when developing and designing such 
products, services and applications, as well as to make sure 
that controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data 
protection obligations, by taking into consideration the state 
of the art (“due regard”); this is the only reference in the 
GDPR to stakeholders others than the data controllers or data 
processors, thus further illustrating the importance of the 
DPbD principle.  
To sum up, the entities directly involved in the 
implementation of the DPbD principle are the data 
controllers, the data processors and the producers. Albeit, it 
is noted that end-users of a product or operators of a system 
may be able to alter its configuration; in this paper the term 
end-users refers to individual customers whereas operators 
refer to employees who work with the system having specific 
access rights and process personal data representing the data 
controller or data processor [17]. 
National supervisory authorities [7], legal scholars [3] as 
well as European Union independent institutions, bodies and 
agencies, such as the European Data Protection Supervisor 
[8] and the European Network and Information Security 
Agency [9] have attempted to provide sets of practical 
requirements. These guidelines aim to assist data controllers 
when choosing among variants of existing software, or 
producers who engage in the creation and development of in-
house new technological tools and systems intended to be 
used for data processing operations, to comply with this new 
legal requirement and stay clear from sanctions and 
administrative fines. Although these guidelines do not refer 
explicitly to cybersecurity products, it is implied that as long 
as personal data processing occurs, DPbD, as provided in 
GDPR, is applicable, unless the product or the system is 
exclusively deployed, for instance, in a law enforcement 
context where specific legal instruments could apply as lex 
specialis [10]. 
In general, what could be considered as an appropriate 
organisational and technical measure must be interpreted 
dynamically depending on the context of the specific 
application and the emerging risks. Article 25(1) and Recital 
78 GDPR include a non-exhaustive list of measures that can 
be taken, with pseudonymisation being a prominent example. 
However, it should be highlighted that technical or 
organisational measures are not standalone; a technical 
measure may only be effective with the parallel 
implementation of organisational measures, and the same 
applies vice-versa. 
As seen above, GDPR adopts a risk-based approach. 
Thus, the concerned entities have to first explore the state of 
the art concerning processing means, by carrying out 
extensive market research and remaining on top of the most 
recent technological developments in standardisation and 
cybersecurity [3]. The maturity of those solutions, as well as 
the cost of implementation, must be taken into account. Only 
the “Best Available Techniques” (BAT) are in principle to be 
selected [8]. 
B. The requirements of DPbD in a nutshell 
The requirements of DPbD - even though no list can be 
exhaustive, as this was not the intention of the co-legislators 
- must address in the most effective manner the data 
protection principles, the data subjects´ rights and provide 
safeguards to accommodate any other requirements set in 
GDPR [3]. Like the DPIA, which in fact constitutes a 
considerable part of DPbD [6], it can be regarded as another 
tool applying similar methodology, aiming to enhance 
compliance with the fundamental principles and 
requirements set out in the law and boosting data subjects´ 
protection.  
The determination of data protection goals could be 
served through various privacy engineering methodologies 
depending on the adopted approach [8]. For example, some 
methodologies invest in a risk-management approach, 
whereas others prefer the creation of design patterns [8]. 
Nevertheless, most of those methodologies are driven by the 
six main protection goals which are usually summarised as: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, unlikability, 
transparency and intervenability [21]. In the US context, the 
last three terms would be replaced by predictability, 
manageability and disassociability [8]. Those six goals will 
be discussed in the next three subchapters. 
1) During the conceptualisation stage 
First of all, as mentioned above, consideration of data 
protection issues has to take place already at the early stages 
of conceptualisation and design and not only during the 
implementation of systems and business practice [7]. This is 
the core of the DPbD principle, i.e. data protection must be 
seen as an essential and indispensable component of every 
processing system from the very start. Second, preliminary 
consideration of the envisaged data processing activities at 
the conceptualisation stage should include a number of steps: 
   
 
   
 
the concerned entity shall conceptualise the data processing 
by clarifying whether the tool or system will be intended to 
proceed personal data and which types of personal data. 
Furthermore, it should determine whether the use of the 
system falls under any of the exceptions where special types 
of personal data can be processed.  
A useful tool to that end could be the creation of data 
flow diagrams via data flow mapping of the different data 
processing activities [8]. Those diagrams will be re-assessed 
in the design and actual development stage as well as in the 
relevant Data Protection Impact Assessment, wherever 
necessary. 
Next, the concerned entity shall identify (possible) data 
controllers and processors or subcontractors and establish - if 
necessary, in the particular context - contractual relations. 
When the creator of the system is either the data controller or 
data processor, the concerned entity should already identify a 
legal basis and a purpose for the processing, as well as with 
respect to storage limitation, the time the data will be kept 
and processed, without excluding the possibility for the need 
to set criteria and plan ahead for automatic erasure. Quite 
early in time, the concerned entity shall also assess the need 
or the possibility for cross-border transfers, since transfers 
would require specific conditions upon which they can be 
considered lawful. 
Equally imperative questions to assess at this stage are 
[7]: how transparency of the activities is planned to be 
achieved. For instance, transparency could be enhanced with 
the introduction of an easily accessible data protection and 
privacy settings dashboard, which would give the end-users 
the possibility to easily exercise their rights; second, since 
every concept would have to be assessed separately, the 
context of the data processing must be defined, since the use 
of the product by LEAs or by individual consumers would 
result in different legal requirements, as mentioned earlier in 
the text. 
Last but not least, the concerned entities would have to 
determine whether special requirements apply in their sector, 
if there are codes of conduct or certification schemes that 
they could benefit from, as well as whether there exist 
guidelines or decisions issued by the respective national 
supervisory authorities or national courts, specifically 
addressing same use cases. In particular, Article 25(3) GDPR 
underlines that adherence to certification schemes as 
provided in Article 42 can be considered as a way of 
demonstrating compliance. 
2) During the design and actual development 
In the previous paragraphs, we briefly listed the 
requirements regarding the preliminary assessment of the 
DPbD in the conceptualisation phase. Requirements 
pertaining to data protection principles to be taken into 
account during the design and actual development phase 
include the following: 
Lawfulness, fairness, and transparency: processing of 
personal data is only lawful if one of the following holds: the 
data subject has given her/his consent; the processing is 
necessary for the performance of a written agreement or 
contract with the data subject; for compliance of a legal 
obligation to protect vital interests of a natural person; to 
perform a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority; and last but not least, for a 
legitimate interest pursued by the data controller. 
Specifically, when the legal ground is consent, the latter must 
be - according to Art. 4(11) of the GDPR - freely given, 
specific, informed and unambiguous (i.e. by a statement or 
by a clear affirmative action), given that consent cannot be 
implied. Although consent is not required to be given in 
written form, provision in written (or in electronic) form is 
recommended due to the accountability requirement of the 
data controller. Moreover, users must be able to withdraw 
consent at any time without negative consequences and 
should be facilitated to do so, if they wish. 
It should be made possible that clear and comprehensible 
information is provided to the data subject regarding the 
purpose of the processing of personal data, the legal basis 
and the recipients of the information [19]. This can be 
fulfilled by designing privacy-friendly user interfaces which 
avoid dark patterns and reduced usability [20]. However, the 
provision of comprehensible information presupposes 
analytic documentation and that the system functionalities 
are thoroughly understood by both the technical and legal 
partners involved in the development of the solution. For 
instance, consent forms bundled with terms and conditions 
for the use of a service do not constitute a valid practice. If 
the last ground of legitimate interest is invoked, then a 
balancing between the interests of the data controller and the 
freedoms and rights of the data subjects should take place. In 
such a case, to ensure a proper balance, appropriate 
safeguards are generally needed to be in place. 
Accordingly, a strong data protection default should be 
established, along with data protection settings which would 
allow the end-user to effectively control without any burden 
his/her preferences. The influence of Data Protection by 
Default to the system design will be assessed to a dedicated 
subchapter below. The processing of personal data must be 
transparent, meaning that the system and its components 
must be designed in a way that relevant aspects of personal 
data processing are known to the data subjects, enabling 
them to make informed decisions and exercise their rights. 
Furthermore, the tool must ensure that other rights, such as 
privacy, freedom of expression and absence of 
discrimination are likewise safeguarded [7]. 
As part of transparency during the design and 
development phase could be also considered the keeping of 
records or relevant documentation, that show how the 
aforementioned requirements have been implemented, which 
vulnerabilities have been discovered and which 
methodologies have been used in respect of data protection. 
This documentation could also contribute to the provision of 
clear and unambiguous information to the data subject as 
seen earlier [7]. 
Purpose and storage limitation: personal data shall only 
be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes 
and shall not be further processed in a manner which is 
incompatible with the original purposes. Moreover, the data 
shall be kept for no longer than it is strictly necessary for the 
purposes pursued. Personal data should be anonymised or 
   
 
   
 
deleted when the purpose of processing is fulfilled. As 
mentioned above, data flow mapping may be necessary in 
order to keep track of those obligations. 
Data minimisation: only adequate, relevant and limited 
to what is necessary for the purpose pursued data should be 
processed. It is self-evident that if a tool can work equally 
satisfactorily with the use of non-personal data, then personal 
data shall not be in principle processed.  
Accuracy: mechanisms shall be envisaged to keep all 
personal data accurate and up-to-date, whereas ensuring that 
incorrect data can be deleted or rectified as quick as possible. 
Integrity and confidentiality: appropriate security 
measures shall be implemented to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the data, such as vulnerability-
reducing mechanisms. 
In addition, the tool must enable the data subject to 
exercise his/her rights, satisfying the goal of intervenability 
[7]. These rights are: the right to access their personal data, 
information about the processing, and other rights; the right 
to rectify their personal data; the right to delete their personal 
data, if applicable; the right to restriction of processing of 
their personal data, if the conditions for restriction apply; the 
right to data portability for their personal data, if the 
processing is based on consent or agreement and is carried 
out by automated means; the right to object against the 
processing of their personal data, if applicable in the specific 
case; rights relating to automated individual decision-
making, including profiling that may have legal 
consequences, or similarly significant effect for the person 
concerned. 
Note though that, in relation with the data minimisation 
principle, if the personal data processed by a controller do 
not allow for identifying the data subject, the data controller 
should not be obliged to acquire additional information in 
order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose of 
complying with the above provisions (see Recital 57 of the 
GDPR). 
3) Impact assessment, testing and post-research 
All the aforementioned if´s are assessed as well in the 
DPIA. Trade-offs that may be encountered depending on the 
circumstances cannot be necessarily solved but can be 
explored with respect to data subjects’ rights and 
interdisciplinary research, aiming to limit mismatches 
between the law and the practice [11]. 
Moreover, the creators of the system must allocate 
sufficient time for multilayer testing, in order to verify that 
the planned DPbD measures were actually implemented and 
they are indeed functional. The Norwegian Data Protection 
Authority recommends different tests to be performed before 
the release of the system, such as data protection 
requirements testing to ensure the integration of all the 
envisaged measures in the conceptualisation and design 
phase and dynamic testing in order to secure functionality in 
case of system failures and restrain risks when different user 
permissions are enforced [7].  
Since cybersecurity is a constantly evolving field, and a 
cybersecurity system as envisaged by the Cyber-Trust 
project is rather dynamic, Data Protection by Design 
requirements would also cover the addition of new features 
and any modifications in the technical measures or 
organisational solutions as well as the maintenance of the 
system [7], in the case the Cyber-Trust final product is 
commercially launched. 
C. Data Protection by Default and System Design 
DPbD and Data Protection by Default are two concepts, 
which are closely inter-related, not only because they 
constitute part of the same provision but primarily because 
default functionalities concerning data protection are 
introduced during the design of a system and can be more or 
less extensive, given the causes pursued [17]. The effect 
such a default setting may have to data subjects’ rights 
becomes obvious by the fact that data protection settings 
may remain unchanged for the whole duration of the use of 
a product, even if data subjects are given a choice to allow 
or deny the processing of their personal data in a broader 
way [18]. In other words, the data subject, as well as the 
operator of the system, may not wish to interfere with those 
settings. 
As simply put by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor “[t]he idea behind the principle [of Data 
Protection by Default] is that privacy intrusive features of a 
certain product or service are initially limited to what is 
necessary for the simple use of it” [18]. Since default 
settings can influence the overall architecture of a system, 
they are, therefore, in the heart of the DPbD and should be 
understood as not requiring active behaviour from the end-
use side [8]. For instance, privacy nudging mechanisms on 
the one hand and facilitated and uncomplicated opt-out 
processes on the other fall under both the scope of DPbD 
and Data Protection by Default [17].  
The strong ties between the two principles implement 
that the one cannot be taken into consideration without the 
other and create an efficient net of all-encompassing 
solutions which satisfy both requirements. 
V. TRANSLATION OF THE DPBD RECOMMENDATIONS INTO 
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
Data in Cyber-Trust reside on four layers: end-user, 
service provider, external knowledge bases and LEAs. 
Depending on the user configuration and mode of operation 
the two latter layers may be inactive. This is the case when 
the device owner registers a device for passive monitoring 
which entitles the reception of notifications and information 
regarding firmware releases and emerging vulnerabilities 
related to their device. Regardless of operation, information 
residing within the Cyber-Trust needs to remain secure in all 
of its stages: acquisition, communication, storage, 
dissemination. Additionally, authority management is a key 
concept of the Cyber-Trust DLT regarding the sensitivity of 
the data stored inside it. Indeed, the forensic evidence stored 
in the DLT and private information relative to an attack are 
critical. 
The Smart Device Agents (SDA) and Smart Gateway 
Agents (SGA) are the two Cyber-Trust components 
responsible for the acquisition of information from end-user 
IoT devices and gateways respectively and represent the 
   
 
   
 
links with the Cyber-Trust core components hosted on the 
service provider layer. Monitoring of the end-user’s gateway 
is by default inactive as it enables active monitoring for all 
connected devices and the need to transfer exchanged traffic 
to the Cyber-Trust backend for DPI; the end-users may 
enable/disable this option through their profile at any time 
only after they have clearly consented to the processing of 
their personal data. In contrast to SGA, SDA operates in a 
more restrictive manner as its purpose is to receive 
information regarding new vulnerabilities and modes of 
operation from the Profiling Service and to communicate 
back in the occurrence of a suspicious event. 
As a form of data minimisation and a measure of 
gathering only data that serve legitimate purposes, the SDA 
exhibits intelligence and performs real-time monitoring. 
Different flavours of SDA will be implemented within the 
framework of Cyber-Trust as a range of smart devices need 
to be accommodated with mainly two modes of operation: 
one being for continuous/ real-time operation and the latter 
for ad-hoc operation when the circumstances call for it. 
The SDA is responsible primarily for the monitoring of 
device’s usage, critical files, security status (patching status, 
firmware integrity, vulnerability risk) as well as suspicious 
network transactions, and secondly for the application of 
mitigation policies and remediation actions after the 
detection of an attack or threat that could endanger the 
integrity and operation of the monitored device. Due to its 
intended operation, the SDA is designed to check whether 
the hosting device performs as intended by its manufacturer, 
ensures that critical OS files are uncompromised and that 
only secure means of communication are used. Data 
regularly synched with the Profiling Service involve 
information regarding runtime processes and used hardware 
resources. Only in the case of identified suspicious traffic 
and activity, network packages are signed by SDA and 
communicated with the Cyber-Trust Cyber Defence service 
for further investigation; metadata regarding this activity are 
registered on the DLT for future reference. 
Data from the SDA and SGA are communicated to the 
Profiling Service (PS), responsible for the storage and 
management of the Cyber-Trust generated and acquired data. 
In particular, two separate access control layers are 
supported: one for defining architectural policies and one for 
controlling runtime operations for matching use preferences. 
Amongst others, the system implements end-user 
anonymisation or pseudonymisation (if desired), data ageing 
and access mechanisms, targeted communication from and 
towards the LEAs, as well as dynamic progress control and 
accountability mechanisms. 
The PS acts as a multi-faceted centralised data 
management system enforcing security on the data level, 
adhering high modularity and horizontal scalability. The PS 
ensures authorised and justified access to maintained data, 
including multimedia and binary content supporting the 
implementation of advanced searching capabilities. Data 
integrity of the original information is preserved with data 
hashes and digital signatures for any embedded multimedia 
object. The original data along with integrity preserving 
metrics are stored in a separate repository in which no 
operator of the system may perform changes, while data 
concerning forensic use and of value to LEAs are stored, 
encrypted, in a separate repository where only authorised 
LEA users are allowed access. 
Data ageing attributes are attached to the object ensuring 
data retention only for the necessary and predefined period of 
time. The renewal of an item’s date of expiration is possible 
and needs to be initiated from an operator with the 
appropriate access key (separated from other functional 
permissions). The PS also implements the mechanisms for 
maintaining extensive system logs and auditing. All 
incoming and outgoing actions/requests are logged and 
retained to the system in the form of a record; only visible to 
operators with appropriate permissions. 
Communication is achieved through Rest API over a 
security channel (SSL/TLS encryption over HTTP), for the 
insertion/addition, retrieval, update, and searching of data. 
As the PS implements extensive mechanisms for data and 
operators access rights, the provision of access tokens is also 
necessary for internally preserving security on preserved 
content. Internal security mechanisms protect the end-user 
against data protection and privacy concerns as well as the 
un-lawful access on data by system operators. 
The Cyber-Trust proposes a sound solution for the 
monitoring and safeguarding of end-user devices, combining 
a range of technologies with a multi-tier and modular 
architecture. Limitations and restrictions for its operation are 
subject to the end-users’ setup and compatibility between 
monitored devices. The method of architecture design in 
Cyber-Trust is the proven Risk- and Cost-Driven 
Architecture (RCDA) based on advantages versus other 
approaches [15]. The advantage of applying this method is 
that it supports architectural and design decision making 
throughout the whole design process started from design. 
Concerns and decisions are weighed throughout the design 
process, and stakeholders’ requirements are constantly 
validated against the design. The design process is iterative 
to ensure high quality results. The fact that RCDA is a 
recognised method in the Open Group Certified Architect 
program, it is an extra advantage for the project and 
consortium partners to promote openness and collaboration 
on the most efficient way of shaping the design and 
architecture. 
VI. REMAINING CHALLENGES 
A. Technical limitations 
The heterogeneity in the design, capabilities and purpose 
of IoT devices impose limitations that the Cyber-Trust 
platform is aiding to bring at the owner’s knowledge. Smart 
devices are generally classified in resource constrained 
devices and high capacity devices. The limitation of 
resources leads to a lack of security mechanisms especially 
when the IoT device is set-up for ease of use. Moreover, 
traditional security practices may not be applicable, 
installation of software updates may be hard or impossible 
because of the device’s complexity or the product being 
discontinued by the manufacturer. For resource constrained 
devices with adequate API support, an additional SDA agent 
   
 
   
 
may be deployed as middleware between the devices and the 
SGA. 
Additional limitations are imposed by the connectivity 
supported by the IoT devices as the latter may communicate 
through channels that the SDA and SGA do not support (i.e. 
Bluetooth, ZigBee); in these cases, monitoring of devices can 
be performed at the hub level (if one exists), potentially 
hindering the system’s effectiveness in identifying malicious 
activity. As a result, the satisfactory provision of Cyber-Trust 
functionalities depends on the capabilities of the end devices, 
and this is a limitation that no system may overcome. 
Even though the SDA is designed to fit a range of IoT 
devices, the development and maintenance of different 
versions of the SDA to capture applicability to enough smart 
devices imposes a great challenge especially considering that 
drastically different approaches are used by IoT 
manufacturers for the production of similar devices. 
B. Legal Compliance 
Perhaps the most important challenge with regards to 
legal compliance is to bring legal and technical 
understanding under common terms. Data protection – as 
well as privacy - in legal terms is not a synonym of security 
in technical terms. Data security constitutes only one of the 
obligations for data controllers (Article 32 GDPR) and one 
single part of a complex system of checks and balances 
established under the data protection law. Often, the notion 
of data protection is wrongfully mistaken for its etymological 
meaning by software engineers and developers, in other 
words, as the application of strong technological measures to 
safeguard the data [11]. Their perception does not usually 
extend to the “if’s” and “how’s” of the collection or other 
processing happening to the data as long as strong security 
safeguards have been implemented. To those 
misunderstandings also contributes the “vague principles” 
argument [5], often attributed to the Privacy by Design 
notion, the non-legally binding “predecessor” of DPbD 
concerning privacy. Nevertheless, it is argued that the data 
protection principles and data subjects rights constitute a 
more robust ground for implementation of specific 
requirements as discussed by a number of legal scholars [11]. 
Effective implementation of those requirements would prove 
by result that DPbD was indeed achieved, as mentioned 
above. 
Tthe fact that the list of organisational and technical 
measures, as provided in GDPR, is only indicative, could 
aggrade the aforementioned challenge, when data controllers 
and producers are called to assess and select the measures. 
Despite the existence of guidelines, the use of international 
standards national and accreditation systems and the efforts 
of the European Standardisation Organisations [8], what 
misses at the moment is a pan-European mechanism to 
establish that the requirements and those auxiliary 
recommendations at the conceptualisation and design phase, 
were in fact taken into consideration and implemented into 
the final product [12]. The EU Cybersecurity Act [16] 
currently under approval by the European Parliament may 
introduce a certification scheme for ICT products, which 
hopefully could lead to further legal clarity and the 
deployment of common standards. Depending on the 
concluding outcome, the co-legislators may call for 
additional requirements and shed light to the implementation 
of appropriate organisational and technical measures “in an 
effective manner”, as appears in Article 25(1) GDPR. 
Moreover, in the course of time other standardisation 
procedures in relation to Articles 42 and 43 of GDPR 
initiated by Member States and including “requirements for 
manufacturers and/or service providers” to implement the 
principles “applicable to all business sectors, including the 
security Industry” could create a baseline for the state of the 
art and enhance country-wide best practices, as a point to 
start with [8]. 
Another misconception that has to be explicitly 
addressed, in order to enhance the common understanding 
among the different involved parties, is that data protection 
compliant does not mean privacy compliant. A privacy 
infringement does not presuppose a data protection 
infringement. The final product most likely will also have to 
meet the privacy requirements, which appeals to further 
consideration from both legal and technical partners; for 
instance, when conducting the overall Impact Assessment 
before its deployment, and therefore Privacy by Design shall 
also be a factor to be reflected upon [13]. 
In addition, a sophisticated and complex system like 
Cyber-Trust consists of both in-house solutions and third 
parties’ tools, depending on the available software kits. 
Concerning the latter, assessing each one of them, as 
required by the DPbD, a posteriori (meaning after they have 
already been created by someone else and in a different 
context) could be rather a time- and resources- consuming or 
even impossible, provided the available information and 
documentation. Even though there are applications which 
help with the evaluation of such software, this would still 
imply dependence on third parties’ evaluation criteria. As for 
the in-house solutions, they would also require component-
by-component and case-by-case assessment. In other words, 
every single tool/system has to be assessed separately in the 
specific context it is intended to be used and for each 
envisaged use, taking into account interdependencies and 
function creeps. Such an assessment would require a very 
high degree of technical comprehension from both the 
technical and the legal partners and could be also rather time-
consuming and resources- demanding task. 
Further, it should be pointed out that anonymising 
personal data, which could possibly be considered as an 
appropriate privacy enhancing technology, needs to be very 
carefully considered. Although there exist several 
anonymisation techniques, none of them should be 
considered as panacea; as Recital 26 of the GDPR states, “to 
determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account 
should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used 
by anyone to identify the natural person directly or 
indirectly, taking into account all objective factors”. In other 
words, before characterising data as anonymous and 
therefore, as non-personal, we need to cautiously answer the 
question whether it is impossible for any party – including 
the data controller - to identify from these data any 
individual [14]. There are many famous examples in the 
literature with regards to “bad” anonymisations which 
allowed for re-identifying some of the end-users in an 
   
 
   
 
“anonymised” set. Hence, in practice, it is highly 
questionable whether, in the case of the Cyber-Trust system 
as in any other system , real anonymisation can be achieved 
right now with the existing technical means, given also the 
2014 Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party on 
anonymisation techniques [14]. Therefore, anonymisation 
techniques should be considered in the Cyber-Trust 
framework and other similar cases as mechanisms to 
promote data protection rather than to actually render data as 
anonymous. 
Similarly, great challenges also occur in the process of 
determining the proper pseudonymisation methods. 
According to Recital 28 of the GDPR, “the application of 
pseudonymisation to personal data can reduce the risks to the 
data subjects concerned and help controllers and processors 
to meet their data protection obligations. The explicit 
introduction of ‘pseudonymisation’ in this Regulation is not 
intended to preclude any other measures of data protection”. 
Pseudonymisation generally refers to hiding the end-users’ 
identities, whereas in the case of the Cyber-Trust system for 
a Smart Home Environment, this could possibly necessitate 
the hiding of devices’ identities, too. Choosing, though, a 
proper pseudonymisation approach constitutes a non-trivial 
task. To this end, all the relevant data protection risks should 
be carefully considered, whilst the proper overall operation 
of the Cyber-Trust system so as to fulfil its primary security 
goals should be ensured. 
Finally, most, if not all, technical measures have to be 
accompanied by organisational measures. Policies have to be 
put in place to enable the rectification and deletion of 
personal data, to keep some areas restricted to only 
authorised individuals and other areas public to registered 
entities as well as to provide information on data subjects’ 
rights. Since the Cyber-Trust system – as is the case with 
other cybersecurity solutions – aims to secure the protected 
systems of the service providers from cyberattacks, facilitate 
the preservation of material which may contain electronic 
evidence and offer a safe and integral way of transfer of the 
latter from service providers to LEAs, wherever the right 
legal authorisation exists, such a Daedalian system would 
require a preliminary assessment of the implementation of 
organisational measures as well. Such preliminary 
assessment would have to, later on, be re-assessed by the 
actual data controller and adapted in the needs of the specific 
data processing. 
VII. CYBER-TRUST PILOTING 
     The integrated Cyber-Trust prototype solution will be 
released in early 2020 to undergo two piloting cycles, 
capturing the needs of its major stakeholders. The first 
piloting cycle is planned to last four months and will focus 
on the platform’s capability in the detection and mitigation 
of cyber-attacks and the solution’s impact when deployed in 
a large scale by an Internet Service Provider (ISP). After the 
end of this phase, the integrated platform will be refined 
with further fixes and updates, as these emerge from the 
needs of the ISP. The final version of the platform will then 
be tested to its full capabilities, for a two-month period, by 
also involving the second key Cyber-Trust stakeholder, 
active LEAs (Cybercrime investigators and Digital Forensic 
examiners). Cyber-Trust committed to the delivery of 
advanced cyber intelligence tools to the open-source 
community will publish its final product publicly on 
GitHub. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The principle of Data Protection by Design as a binding 
requirement for data controllers was introduced in the EU 
Member States law with the General Data Protection 
Regulation. Deriving from the principle of accountability, 
such a requirement according to Recital 78 GDPR seems to 
extend also to manufacturers and providers of software and 
other IT systems. The DPbD refers to the implementation of 
technical and organisational measures which aim to ensure 
the data protection principles and safeguard data subjects’ 
rights already in the very first stages of the creation of a new 
product or a system, namely the conceptualisation, design 
and actual development. 
The discussion was based on the research conducted and 
the conclusions drawn within the Cyber-Trust project and is 
pertaining both to the research phase and the post-research 
phase concerning the launch of the final product. So far, the 
Cyber-Trust helped us to study how the Data Protection by 
Design requirements can be integrated into a cybersecurity 
system, given the trade-offs established by technical 
limitations and legal challenges. However, the finest details 
will be tuned in the forthcoming pilots and will be assessed 
in the two Data Protection Impact Assessments that will 
follow, requiring further interdisciplinary research and 
cooperation. 
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